Since the extension is targeted at new users, a MitM or exploit on
our website could defeat any verification technique by providing
simplified instructions or by faking ISO verification.
To mitigate such
an attack in some cases we could both:
- Encourage external documentation (screencasts on YouTube, printed
forms, etc.). But those would be vulnerable to other kind of
- Not rely on the website to perform the ISO verification (use the
add-ons menu for example). But the UX will suffer from this...
#3 Updated by sajolida about 4 years ago
- Status changed from Confirmed to Resolved
Since people installing Tails will have to rely on our website to provide trustworthy instructions anyway, explaining on the website how to do a better verification without relying on the website seems contradictory or at least not worth the complication in UX that it brings. And this is even more true as the extension is targetted primarily at first time user who will most likely land on our website first and install from there (for full upgrades we should rather work on #7499).
External ressources like books, security guides, and other training material should maybe instead encourage people to go through the Debian expert verification, if possible, which would then effectively provide stronger authentication.