Tor probably has one the biggest attack surface exposed by Tails to a network attacker. It also knows the IP that's being used to connect to the Internet. Therefore, anything is welcome to make it harder, for an attacker, to escalate from "Tor exploited" to "whole system under's attacker control" or deanonymization.
When a container-based solution becomes a viable, secure solution for creating isolated jails, the chroot approach used by the unsafe browser will be easily adaptable to contain Tor.
Alternatively, AppArmor confinement should be considered.
- Type of work changed from Wait to Code
- Starter set to No
- Subject changed from contain Tor to Sandbox Tor
- Blocked by deleted (Feature #6178: Evaluate current state of Linux namespaces)
- Status changed from Confirmed to In Progress
- Assignee set to intrigeri
- Target version changed from Hardening_M1 to Tails_1.2
- % Done changed from 0 to 50
- Feature Branch set to feature/apparmor
- Related to deleted (Feature #5385: Have 3 AppArmor profiles in enforce mode)
- Assignee deleted (
- QA Check set to Ready for QA
- Status changed from In Progress to Fix committed
- % Done changed from 50 to 100
- QA Check changed from Ready for QA to Pass
- Status changed from Fix committed to Resolved
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