Revisit network fingerprinting design wrt. NTP
What kind of fingerprinting resistance a system like Tails can reasonably pretend to, at the network scale? How safe is the current "Tor, nothing else, no NTP"? Shall we emmit a fake NTP query (when others that usually do) and drop it, as suggested by adrelanos?
See "secure and simple network time (hack)" thread or tor-talk, around July 2012.
Also see discussion about fingerprinting on Time syncing.
- Assignee set to anonym
- Starter set to No
- Subject changed from network fingerprint to Network fingerprint
- Subject changed from Network fingerprint to Revisit network fingerprinting design wrt. NTP
- Assignee deleted (
- Type of work changed from Code to Research
- Description updated (diff)
- Blocked by Feature #5975: Update design documentation about network fingerprinting added
- Related to Feature #5424: Think about tordate htpdate changes added
- Category set to Time synchronization
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